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Introduction: A Web of Prevention?
Daniel Feakes, Brian Rappert and Caitríona McLeish
In June 2006, an ominous article titled ‘Dark materials’ appeared in the UK
newspaper the Guardian. In it, the author warned about future dangers to the
human population and the planet as a whole because of developments in
science. He stated:
We are collectively endangering our planet, but there is a potential threat
from individuals too. ‘Bio’ and ‘cyber’ expertise will be accessible to
millions. It does not require large, special-purpose facilities as do nuclear
weapons. Even a single person will have the capability to cause widespread
disruption through error or terror.
Among the many areas of science identified as raising serious questions, biotech-
nology was said to be enabling ‘qualitatively’ novel forms of human intervention.
The article went on to state: ‘There is an ever-widening gap between what
science allows, and what we should actually do. There are many doors science
can open that should be kept closed, on prudential or ethical grounds.’
While highlighting the significant potential for societal benefit associated with
scientific developments, the author also called for meaningful forms of restraint.
He advocated that scientists:
… should forgo experiments that are risky or unethical. More than that,
they should foster benign spin-offs, but resist dangerous or threatening
applications.They should raise public consciousness of hazards to environ-
ment or health.
Furthermore, claims were made that the choices in the application of science
were too important to be left to scientists alone to handle.
What made this contribution particularly noteworthy was its author: Lord
Martin Rees, then also serving as the president of the British Royal Society, one
of the world’s oldest academies of eminent scientists.
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The article received a number of responses, including one from Professor
Ross Anderson at Cambridge University (Anderson, 2006). This professor of
security engineering said that the system of ‘worldwide surveillance and regula-
tion’ proposed by Lord Rees was both ‘foolish and wicked’. Further to this, he
argued:
Controls on biological technologies are particularly foolish. The diseases
that kill millions are not biowar lab nasties, but naturally occurring
pathogens such as HIV, Sars and flu. If the US and Europe won’t let
Sudanese students do PhDs in pathology, then Khartoum won’t have
capable public health services – which could be bad news for us next time
a virus starts making its way down the Nile.
Instead of embracing the sorts of controls identified by Martin Rees, Professor
Anderson proposed that ‘The scientist’s job is to shine light in the darkness, and
if we occasionally burn our fingers on the candle, so be it. Lord Rees can choose
the darkness if he wants. I’m not going to.’
The account of the exchange raises many questions: What destructive possi-
bilities are enabled by modern science? Are these bringing hitherto novel
capabilities for causing death or disruption? What are the chances that such
potentials turn into actualities? To what extent might science need to be
controlled because of security fears? Who should determine what measures are
prudent?
In response to concerns regarding biological weapons, during recent years a
number of individuals and organizations have proposed the need for a ‘web of
prevention’. While such a web is not intended to block out all light, so to speak,
the various appeals made for it do suggest that something should be done to
reduce the likelihood that biological weapons are developed or employed. This
book provides an examination of the possible elements of such a web, one specif-
ically focused on the governance of scientific research. The contributors do so
while also giving critical attention to the assumptions – regarding the nature of
threats and the possible effects of responses – underlying such a call.
Origins
The concept of a ‘web’ of measures to address biological weapons overall has a
relatively recent pedigree, with its origins in the early 1990s. However, a similar
concept, that of a ‘regime’, was used during the 1980s to describe international
measures adopted against chemical weapons.Today, while both web and regime
are still frequently used, another term that has come into common currency in
relation to efforts to deal with the problem of chemical and biological weapons
is ‘network’. Although each term has different origins and different implications,
they all have, at root, the idea that there is no single ‘solution’ to the challenges
posed by chemical and biological weapons, that multilateral arms control
conventions are only a part of the response, albeit a very significant one, and that
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in order to effectively counter chemical and biological weapons, other comple-
mentary measures are required.
Over the decades since the entry into force of the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), the attention paid to the complementary elements of the
web has waxed and waned. However, the concept appears to be undergoing
something of a resurgence in recent years, stimulated by the re-emergence of
international terrorism, dramatic advances in science and technology, changes in
the nature and conduct of diplomacy, and the rise of significant new actors.
Tracing the evolution and connection between notions of webs, regimes and
networks will sharpen our focus about the prospects for a web and help situate
the contribution of the authors to this volume. It will also be used here to recount
policy and conceptual developments during recent years regarding the prohibi-
tion of biological weapons.
Webs
In 1993, Graham Pearson, then the Director-General of the Chemical and
Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down in the UK, introduced the
concept of the ‘web of deterrence’ into the debate on chemical and biological
arms control (Pearson, 1993, p150). Pearson wrote that it has ‘become evident
that no arms-control regime is guaranteed to be wholly effective’ and that what
was therefore needed was ‘a strategy that complements arms control with a
range of other measures to form a web of deterrence’. He identified the key
elements of such a web as comprehensive, verifiable and global chemical and
biological arms control; broad export monitoring and controls; effective defen-
sive and protective measures; and a range of determined and effective national
and international responses to the acquisition and/or use of chemical and biolog-
ical weapons (Pearson, 1993, p151).
The ‘web of deterrence’ concept has also been reflected in national policy.
The 1993 Defence White Paper stated that ‘it is likely that worthwhile deterrence
[of biological weapons] could be achieved by a web of measures restricting
potential violators’ room for manoeuvre’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 1993, p58);
a 1999 Ministry of Defence publication stated that ‘our policy rests on four
inter-related pillars: arms control, preventing supply, deterring use and defend-
ing against use’ (UK Ministry of Defence, 1999); and three years later, a UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2002, p5) paper stated that this four-pillar
approach ‘remains at the heart of our policy’.
And yet, the origin of the term ‘web of deterrence’ goes back further than the
1990s in relation to security discussions as a whole. It can be found in the
doctrine of ‘flexible response’, which had been adopted by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1967 in place of its earlier strategy of massive
nuclear retaliation. Flexible response sought to deter aggression by the mainte-
nance of conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic nuclear forces that would
enable the alliance to respond to any attack at an appropriate level (Legge, 1983,
p9). Lawrence Freedman (1981) wrote that ‘flexible response offered the notion
of a seamless web of deterrence’, and Williams (1983, p198) wrote that the
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NATO decision in 1979 to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles in Western
Europe ‘will not necessarily restore the “seamless web” of deterrence as was
initially hoped’. For their part, the Soviet Union also referred to its combination
of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons as the ‘seamless web of deterrence’
(USA National Intelligence Council, 1999).
The ‘web of deterrence’ description was appropriate for biological weapons
in the early 1990s when the Warsaw Pact was only just unravelling and when
such weapons were seen mainly in the context of military conflict between the
East and West. However, by the late 1990s, Pearson, by then a visiting professor
at the University of Bradford, had adjusted his terminology to reflect ‘an age of
regional or local conflicts’ and demands from the public for reassurance that
governments would protect them from biological weapons, whether possessed
by rogue states or non-state actors (Pearson, 2001, p8). For this reason, Pearson
instead called for a ‘web of reassurance’ with similar but broader constituent
elements, compared to his earlier ‘web of deterrence’: a strong international and
national prohibition regime reinforcing the norm that biological weapons are
totally prohibited; broad international and national controls on the handling,
storage, use and transfer of dangerous pathogens; preparedness, including both
active and passive protective measures and response plans that have been exer-
cised; and determined national and international response to any use or threat of
use of biological weapons, ranging from diplomatic sanctions through to armed
intervention (Pearson, 2001, p8).
Today, the notion of a web of measures is often evoked in discussions on the
control of biological weapons. A 1999 British Medical Association publication –
Bioweapons,Technology and Humanity (primarily written by Pearson’s Bradford
colleague Malcolm Dando) – focuses on the concept of a ‘web of deterrence’ to
prevent the acquisition and use of biological weapons (British Medical
Association, 1999). In 2002, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) launched an initiative on Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity, call-
ing for a reaffirmation of norms against biological weapons and for better
controls on potentially dangerous biotechnology (Kellenberger, 2002). Central
to the initiative are awareness-raising and education activities directed at life
scientists in order to contribute to what the ICRC calls a ‘web of prevention’. In
a 2003 publication, the ICRC stated:
Those in a position to help prevent biotechnology being used for hostile
purposes too often focus on only one aspect of the solution, such as the
Biological Weapons Convention, bio-safety rules, disease surveillance or
countering ‘bio-terrorism’. Seldom is synergy of action achieved between
the different entities concerned. (ICRC, 2003, p6).
Therefore, the ICRC envisages the ‘web of prevention’ as a ‘broad and integra-
tive approach that should be taken by all those concerned to minimize the risk’.
It uses the analogy of fire prevention to explain the intention behind the web.
Interestingly, the same analogy is used in a recent report by the US National
Academies (2006, p4), Globalization, Biosecurity and the Future of the Life
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Sciences, which calls for a ‘web of protection’. According to the report, ‘the
committee could not envision any sort of “silver bullet” capable of providing
absolute protection against the malevolent application of new technologies’ (US
National Academies, 2006, p16). Instead, the actions and strategies recom-
mended in the report are described as ‘complementary and synergistic’.
Regimes
The notion of creating a broad and synergistic array of measures to address the
problem of biological and chemical weapons is not a recent innovation. One
important source of earlier thinking can be found in the international relations
field of regime analysis, which emerged during the mid 1970s as scholars sought
to understand the dramatic increase in cooperative arrangements between states
(see Ruggie, 1975; Keohane and Nye, 1977). A widely accepted definition of a
regime was put forward in 1982 by a group of American scholars: ‘sets of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international rela-
tions’ (Krasner, 1982, p186).
The first scholar to apply regime analysis to the problem of chemical or
biological weapons was Robinson (1985). Since then, the regime has been
further extended by the coordination of national export controls among a group
of like-minded countries within the Australia Group; the empowerment of the
United Nations (UN) Secretary-General to investigate allegations of the use of
chemical and biological weapons; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC); and, most recently, UN Security Council resolution 1540. In 1988,
Nicholas Sims described a ‘treaty regime of biological disarmament’ centred on
the BWC (Sims, 1988, p5) and, in a later publication, described how this regime
was ‘defined and developed by a process of cumulative diplomacy and accretion’
(Sims, 2001, p18). Sims also illustrated how the concept of a ‘treaty regime’ was
used by diplomats, particularly Ambassador Winfried Lang of Austria (Lang,
1990), and by academics, such as Falk (1990) and Meselson and colleagues
(1990).
An attempt was made during the 1990s to develop a CWC-style comprehen-
sive regime for biological weapons through the negotiation of a supplementary
protocol to the BWC. According to the most comprehensive account of the
BWC protocol negotiations, the conceptual approach taken was of a ‘single
treaty silver-bullet “solution” to the biological weapons problem’ (Littlewood,
2005, p203). The approach adopted was modelled closely on the CWC, with a
system of declarations and inspections overseen by an international organiza-
tion. This has since been acknowledged by two of those who participated in the
Ad Hoc Group established in 1994 with a mandate to negotiate the BWC proto-
col (Randin and Borrie, 2005, p101; Lennane, 2006, p7).
However, it is interesting to note that this single-treaty model was not the only
possible option for creating a regime. As already mentioned above, even before
the entry into force of the CWC, a fragmented regime existed against chemical
weapons. Bernauer (1993, p375) noted how there were two basic options for
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resolving the chemical warfare problem: the comprehensive ‘once-and-for-all’
solution that was eventually adopted, or an incremental approach based upon
partial agreements of varying formality. Outlining possibilities for the latter,
Bernauer (1993, p378) mentioned the following: expanding the Australia
Group; amending or supplanting the Geneva Protocol; strengthening the
Geneva Protocol by developing its existing investigation and enforcement mech-
anisms; establishing chemical weapon-free zones; reducing chemical weapons
stockpiles; or imposing chemical disarmament obligations on specific states
through coercion. A similar incremental approach would also have been possi-
ble for the BWC during the 1990s. However, state parties chose to follow the
single-treaty approach modelled on the CWC.
This approach ultimately failed in 2001 at the Fifth Review Conference when
the ‘vision text’ which the Ad Hoc Group chairman had drafted was rejected by
the US, with a number of other state parties more quietly not in favour.The US
additionally rejected the approach taken by the Ad Hoc Group since 1995, argu-
ing that ‘the traditional approach that has worked well for many other types of
weapons is not a workable structure for biological weapons’ (Mahley, 2001).
During the 1990s, international action against biological weapons had been
focused on strengthening the BWC almost to the exclusion of everything else (see
Littlewood, 2004, p14). This imbalance was evident both internationally and
nationally. Within states there were few individuals or agencies with a compre-
hensive overview of all measures aimed at addressing biological weapons.
Networks
The sudden loss of what had been the guiding ambition for six years was quickly
followed by the terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001.The dramatic rise
of the combination of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
as the main threat facing developed nations has led to much greater emphasis on
building collaboration and improving synergy. Moodie (2004) notes that ‘the
combination of politics, science and technology, and the treaty language of the
CWC and BWC ensures that these conventions will be insufficient on their own’
to deal with the threat posed by international terrorism. He goes on:
What is needed is an approach that goes beyond the traditional modalities
of arms control to new ways of thinking about how to strengthen the
conventions and the norms against CBW that these conventions embody.
(Moodie, 2004, p48)
In that spirit there has been an explosion in the number of initiatives, measures,
efforts and activities either directly or indirectly aimed at addressing the biolog-
ical weapons problem (e.g. the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global
Health Security Initiative, the G8 Global Partnership and UN Security Council
resolution 1540).
Nowhere is this more apparent than in efforts to prevent the misuse of the life
sciences. Stimulated, in part, by the ICRC’s Biotechnology, Weapons and
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Humanity initiative, but also by the decision of BWC state parties to examine
the issue of codes of conduct for life scientists in 2005, the past five years have
witnessed a significant rise in the engagement with those in the life sciences. For
example, in 2005 representatives of 23 international, regional and national scien-
tific and professional bodies were allowed to participate in the BWC Meeting of
Experts as ‘guests of the meeting’, an innovation described by one observer as ‘a
considerable step for a convention that had hitherto permitted only states and –
with limitations – intergovernmental organizations to participate in its meetings’
(Lennane, 2006). In many ways, though the initial expectations were very low,
the work programme adopted by BWC state parties in 2002 has proved a signif-
icant innovation and has, in fact, shifted the BWC into a different mode of
action. The annual meetings organized between 2003 and 2005 have seen the
active involvement of private industry, international organizations and a wide
range of civil society actors. They have also demonstrated the need for
approaches across a range of areas; according to a European Union (EU) paper,
this range ‘goes well beyond the “national only” approach and also well beyond
the “multinational” agenda as traditionally understood’ (EU, 2006, p5).
Further, prior to the Sixth BWC Review Conference in November 2006,
BWC President Masood Khan actively encouraged attendance by international
organizations; as a result, six international organizations addressed the confer-
ence, as well as the UN Secretary-General himself. Also attending was a record
number of 33 non-governmental organizations (NGOs).The review conference
ended successfully with agreement on another inter-sessional work programme
modelled on the 2003 to 2005 meetings and on the need to establish a small
Implementation Support Unit in Geneva and to encourage state parties to create
national contact points for interaction with this unit and each other. Therefore,
although it is only early days, the review conference sowed the seed for a poten-
tially significant new set of interactions.
Whether the framework of regime analysis is still adequate to conceptualize
and understand this plethora of activity is debatable. Although regime analysis
was, in part, intended as a shift away from realist conceptions of international
relations with its acknowledgement of normative factors and of the influence of
domestic politics on state behaviour, regime analysis is still a largely state-
centred framework. However, the biological weapons problem is no longer (if,
indeed, it ever was) one that is solely confined to or manageable by states.
As demonstrated by Rischard (2003), the world is witnessing the emergence
of ‘global issue networks’ on topics that cannot be dealt with by one state alone.
The existence of networks between governments is not novel. However, while
government networks themselves are not new, a number of factors distinguish
contemporary networks from their predecessors. As identified by Slaughter
(2004, pp10–11), these include the ‘scale, scope and type’ of transgovernmental
ties, the ‘wider array of functions’ performed than in the past, and the fact that
they have ‘spread far beyond regulators to judges and legislators’.
Reflecting the complexity of countering biological weapons and the rise of
networks in other areas of international relations, in 2006 the UN Secretary-
General proposed the creation of:
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… a forum that will bring together the various stakeholders –
Governments, industry, science, public health, security, the public writ large
– into a common program, built from the bottom up, to ensure that biotech-
nology’s advances are used for the public good and that the benefits are
shared equitably around the world. (UN, 2006)
Such a forum would be a true ‘global issue network’ as conceptualized by
Rischard (2003). The forum has been endorsed by UN member states; but at
the time of writing it has yet to be formally constituted.
The nature of diplomacy itself has also changed in recent years, meaning that
diplomats themselves are now not so wedded to concepts and methods of the
past. This is partly a response to the changing nature of the challenges that
modern diplomats face. A key facet of the varying nature of diplomacy is the
emergence of civil society as a significant actor in world politics. In its 2004
report, the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations
stated that ‘the rise of civil society is, indeed, one of the landmark events of our
times. Global governance is no longer the sole domain of governments’ (UN,
2004). Another key factor is the role now played by private industry and the
‘increased contemporary significance of an upward trend in the management of
global affairs by economic actors’ (Cutler et al, 1999, p4).
Taken together, all of these factors have led to the emergence of ‘multi-stake-
holder diplomacy’. Hocking (2006, p13) argues that:
… actors, including states – commonly identified as the generators of diplo-
macy – are no longer able to achieve their objectives in isolation from one
another. Diplomacy is becoming an activity concerned with the creation of
networks, embracing a range of state and non-state actors focusing on the
management of issues that demand resources over which no single partici-
pant possesses a monopoly.
One small example is the way in which a Geneva-based NGO, the BioWeapons
Prevention Project, has been entrusted with the implementation of an outreach
and assistance programme adopted by a regional organization, in this case the
EU. The examples given above, such as the shift in approach demonstrated by
the 2003 to 2005 work programme, the UN Secretary-General’s ‘bio-forum’
proposal and the decisions at the Sixth BWC Review Conference, all suggest
that ‘multi-stakeholder diplomacy’ is another vital element in international
efforts to address the biological weapons problem complementary to webs,
regimes or networks.
What is apparent today is that countering the development or use of biologi-
cal weapons is not a matter that can be solved for all time, nor is it one that can
be managed by states alone, nor can it be addressed simply through a single
treaty or some other instrument of international collective action. What is
required is a broad array of measures at all levels, from the individual to the
international, that are complementary and synergistic.What this array is called –
web, regime or network – is, in many respects, largely immaterial. The main
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thing is that its constituent elements are in place and are able to manage an issue
that is only likely to get more complex.
Outline of the book
While the previous section provided an overview of policy and conceptual devel-
opments in relation to webs, regimes and networks to address the development
and use of biological weapons overall, this book focuses on a specific and emerg-
ing priority area: the governance of life science research. A central justification
for exploring this area in isolation from other elements of the web of responses
initiatives is that because international law has outlawed these weapons, much of
the attention needs to be placed on the components for weapons – this includes
the scientific and technological components.
Because much of the same knowledge, tools and techniques needed to
develop and produce biological weapons are also used in activities such as scien-
tific research, drug and vaccine production, agriculture and industrial
processing, it is essential to bring in all those who work upon, trade in, move,
finance and regulate in their respective domains. A web-based approach that
broadens the horizon of security concerns to incorporate technology gover-
nance, allowing relevant initiatives, measures, efforts and activities initiated for a
variety of reasons by a range of stakeholders, often with no security agenda, to
be linked together in the name of reducing the potential for science and tech-
nology, can be diverted to malign applications.
The need and potential for such an expansive approach is argued for in
Chapter 1. During recent years, particularly because of the 2005 meetings held
as part of the BWC, renewed attention has been given to the role of professional
and workplace codes of conduct. Against the backdrop of existing legal rules and
ethical norms proscribing the development of bioweapons, Chapter 1 argues for
the importance of establishing codes to further ethical reflection, formulate
agreed standards and facilitate deliberation. More than just considering the role
of codes, Atlas and Somerville provide a useful background on a range of initia-
tives, regulations and laws currently being considered to prevent the destructive
use of the life sciences.
When the application of standards of conduct is mooted, then a frequent
response is the need to enact protections for those so-called ‘whistleblowers’ that
point out carelessness, ignorance or intent. In a wide-ranging analysis of the
experiences of past whistleblowers in Chapter 2, however, Martin contends that
such official channels rarely provide the type of protection so often expected of
them. Rather, much more attention needs to be given to improving the knowl-
edge, skills and contacts of would-be whistleblowers.
Many of the options covered in this book depend upon knowledgeable and
cognizant individuals or they aim to enhance individuals’ thinking. In Chapter 3,
Rappert assesses what functions can be fulfilled by educating those associated
with the life sciences in preventing the accidental or deliberate spread of disease.
As contended, because practical attempts to educate require deciding just who
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needs to know what and how that understanding should come about, they can
often generate contention. This is all the starker in the case of educating highly
trained and specialized scientific and technical experts who are often said to be
best left to govern themselves. Following on from these points about education,
in Chapter 4, Finney, a practising physicist, offers his reflections on the social
responsibility of scientists and the state of discussions within the physicist
community to address the destructive applications of their research.
One set of responses to prevent this and the accidental spread of disease in
relation to the life sciences has been to propose national and international over-
sight systems for research. In Chapters 7 and 8, the prospects for such systems
are examined. In Chapter 7, Harris surveys prominent existing proposals for
formal oversight and, in particular, outlines the rationale for the Biological
Research Security System developed by her and colleagues at the Center for
International and Security Studies in Maryland, US. In Chapter 8, Holohan,
formerly executive director of the US National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity, assesses the Maryland system and situates it within wider national
and international considerations about oversight.
The contribution of expert advice is a well-established means by which
members of the scientific community seek to shape government decision-
making. Two chapters in this book address expert advice. The first, in Chapter
5, is an account by the British Royal Society of the conclusions of an interna-
tional workshop of scientists, policy analysts, officials and others held at the
Royal Society from 4 to 6 September 2006. Building on similar activities under
the Chemical Weapons Convention, this workshop intended to identify scientific
and technological developments most relevant to the BWC in order to inform
deliberations at the Sixth Review Conference. In Chapter 6, Rhodes and Dando
provide a wider examination of the potential for scientific expert advice in
furthering the BWC and thus furthering a web.
Denying technology transfers in order to reduce the risks of proliferation and
terrorism involving biological weapons is a central policy response to the prob-
lem of biological weapons. In Chapter 9, Littlewood examines the role and
function of export controls in managing the threat posed by biological weapons
and considers whether or not export controls represent a boundary to interna-
tional science. In Chapter 10, Mathews considers the role played by the Australia
Group and reflects upon the growing acceptance of the Australia Group export-
control lists as an international benchmark in relation to export controls directed
at CBW proliferation. In his opinion, a national export licensing system based
on the Australia Group lists should be regarded as an essential component of the
‘web of prevention’.
Although controls on the transfer of technology, the dissemination of infor-
mation and associated monitoring of scientists to prevent harmful information
being made public has been flagged positively as part of a web of prevention,
Balmer notes in Chapter 11 that the spectre of undue censorship and excessive
secrecy can follow rapidly in its wake. Contributing to contemporary debates
about transparency and secrecy and the dissemination of certain forms of scien-
tific research, Balmer reflects on the operation of secrecy in the British biological
10 A Web of Prevention
3213 J&J A Web of Prevention  31/8/07  2:40 pm  Page 10
weapons programme, noting that secrecy can be constructed, lost and restored
through the use of rumour and gossip.
In Chapter 12, McLeish offers reflections on the issue of dual use. Exploring
the differing conceptualizations of dual use found in regulatory responses to the
biological weapons problem and governance initiatives, McLeish details three
distinct models of dual use that are currently evident. Complementary to an
extent, she reflects on whether such differing conceptualizations might lead to
lost governance opportunities through the exclusion of stakeholders and unhelp-
ful competition. McLeish calls for an intellectual space to be opened where
relevant security, technology and innovation experts, together with all interested
stakeholders, can work together to strengthen the foundations of the web of
prevention.
One example of the sort of innovative work that can be generated when tradi-
tional and non-traditional security stakeholders come together is when
governance of dual use research is considered as an international health security
issue. In Chapter 13,Tuerlings relates the work of the World Health Organization
(WHO) and, in particular, the work being conducted as part of the Life Science
Research and Development and Global Security project.This includes details of
the work performed by a specially convened scientific working group consisting
of a mix of public health workers, academicians, researchers, policy-makers,
security experts and representatives from international organizations.
These chapters then attempt to reflect key parts of the web of prevention.
Although it is recognized that many more chapters could have been included
(particularly to include reflections on initiatives centred outside of the West), the
topics covered span a wide-ranging set of issues that should give an illustration
of what might be done.
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